The Triumphant Beginning
The first European Union meeting hosted by Angela Merkel in December 2005 hinted at what was to come. Over a seven-year budget, Tony Blair and Jacques Chirac were at odds. The chancellor evaluated others' red lines after three weeks in power, instructed Mr Blair and Mr Chirac on the finer issues, and created a settlement after hours of negotiating (and lubricating the wheels with German money). Because she has established herself as the indispensable European—expertly prepared, invested in interpersonal relationships, and possessing almost superhuman negotiating stamina—the rest of Europe may be worried about Mrs Merkel's departure.
Mrs Merkel has kept Europe together when it matters most, leading the battle against Russia following its attack on Ukraine, remaining firm on Brexit, and now agreeing to joint EU financing for the EU's post-pandemic recovery fund. A fair accounting, however, would find plenty to criticise.
Immigration Crisis
During the eurozone crisis, Merkel pressured nations like Greece into painful austerity measures. Further, the establishment of a narrative of fiscal irresponsibility worsened and prolonged Europe's slump. Her unilateralism on border policy and negotiations with Turkey enraged her partners in 2015-16, exacerbating an east-west divide. Many believe she could have done more to combat authoritarianism in Poland and Hungary. During the summer of 2015, Merkel established an open-door policy with hundreds of thousands of asylum seekers fleeing turmoil in the Middle East, crossing the Mediterranean Sea into Greece, and then continuing westward. She waived the requirements of the EU's Dublin Regulation, which would have allowed Germany to return any asylum-seekers to the first EU country they had travelled through, and instead stated that Syrian refugees who made it to Germany would be permitted to stay. Although many Germans were concerned that the stream of refugees would overwhelm the country, Merkel famously said, "We can do it!" (We do it!) Merkel definitely desired to avoid a humanitarian calamity. She realised Greece could not handle the massive influx of refugees, especially after its disputed third referendum.
She observed that Greece was unable to handle the large influx of refugees, particularly since its extremely contentious third bailout had just been granted that summer, and that tensions were rising among the nations that refugees were travelling through on their way to the west. When faced with this disaster, she acted alone in declaring that more than 1 million predominantly Syrian refugees could continue on to Germany, where they would be welcomed with open arms, while insisting from the outset on the necessity for a unified EU response. Merkel's unilateral action was humane, but it became rapidly apparent that she was unable to persuade her other leaders to adopt a coordinated strategy to address the migratory situation. Merkel travelled to Ankara in the spring of 2016 to negotiate an agreement that would provide Turkey with an additional 3 billion euros ($3.69 billion) and other benefits in return for the nation not allowing refugees to enter the EU. Later, similar agreements were reached with Libya and Morocco, which are hardly models of "safe third nations." While many applaud Merkel's first outpouring of compassion toward migrants, even less understand that she soon gave up advocating for a compassionate shared EU migration policy and instead approved a strategy in which the EU essentially pays transit nations to retain refugees often in profoundly inhumane conditions—to prevent them from entering Europe. When Merkel first demanded this back in the summer of 2015, the EU was no closer to deciding on revisions to the asylum laws, including a more balanced distribution of refugees among EU member states, than it is today. Over 14,000 migrant deaths have been reported in the Mediterranean Sea since then, which is a heartbreaking truth.
Economic Crisis
In 2005, Germany was widely referred to as the "sick man of Europe" due to its 11% unemployment rate. Two years later, the world financial crisis struck, putting numerous European nations' economies into a tailspin. Germany is now the fourth-largest economy in Europe, with a high quality of living, nearly full employment, and unprecedented budget surpluses thanks to Merkel's measures during the crisis and her business-friendly stance in the years that followed. Nevertheless, despite these achievements, Merkel mostly benefited from the economic policies implemented by her predecessor. Gerhard Schröder's economic reforms in labour and welfare increased the nation's competitiveness, but by the time the benefits could be realised, Merkel had already become the chancellor.
Merkel's handling of the Eurozone debt crisis, which wreaked havoc on the economy of numerous southern European nations, will be remembered more than her domestic economic initiatives. She and other EU leaders had to decide whether to rescue troubled member nations like Greece and Ireland or let them go into default on the debts they were mostly responsible for, due to banks in Germany, the Netherlands, and France. As part of her renowned cautious and risk-averse leadership style, Merkel was initially hesitant to commit to a rescue fund but ultimately consented to a plan for the European Central Bank to avert a sovereign debt default by buying bonds in return for southern European nations implementing stringent austerity measures after being pressured by other European leaders.
Following that, Merkel received criticism from both sides of the political spectrum. On the one hand, southern European nations object to the strict austerity measures enforced by Berlin, while on the other, a number of northern European nations desired the complete expulsion of defaulters like Greece from the Eurozone.
Merkel's narrative, according to many economists, was to blame the defaulting countries for "fiscal profligacy and lagging competitiveness," creating a "morality tale of Northern saints and Southern sinners." In contrast, they argue that real leadership would have required acknowledging and addressing the structural roots of the Eurozone woes—pointing out that fiscal and banking crises were inevitable in a monetary union where capital flowed freely in the absence of adequate joint mechanisms to coordinate fiscal policy.
Merkel's policies strengthened an already strong German economy, whose industrial base and exports considerably profited from a weaker Euro, even though they were bad for Germany's neighbours. This approach backed by Merkel essentially allowed core countries to provide financial bailouts to peripheral countries which were then used to pay out German banks. Many criticise her for her opportunism but when seen from a nationalist perspective, Merkel's policies transformed Germany into the economic and political powerhouse it is today.
Merkel with Macron
Merkel quickly rose to prominence as the face of stability in Europe after gaining office in 2005. Despite the fact that Franco-German collaboration is based on a complex web of connections at all levels of the political system, the two leaders' duet is extremely symbolic and typically sets the tone for the partnership as a whole.
Emmanuel Macron's entry at the Élysée sparked hopes for a vigorous recovery after the comparatively chilly years of the Merkel-Hollande era. The president surrounded himself with individuals who spoke fluent German right away, and Macron quickly became what can be called a "charm offensive" in Germany. A French administration with this much knowledge, empathy, and expertise about Germany had never existed before. However, Angela stuck to her usual strategy of waiting to see whether lofty promises are actually followed by acts. This Merkel-German stance was (and still is) frequently seen in France as heartless and contributed to the idea that Germany, regrettably, has simply neglected numerous French projects.
The structure of Franco-German collaboration is consistent and extremely solid, despite the ups and downs and the very different personalities that have moulded the pair over the years.
Conclusion
However, the EU and the Euro have been successful for Germany, so it is unclear why any chancellor would advocate for significant change. After the war, inclusion into the club of civilised nations required participation in the European project, but more recently, it has been the driving force behind German affluence. The single market's trading freedoms, skilled immigrants from central Europe, low-wage labour in that region, and the affordable euro have all been positives. Even after Brexit, the majority of German exports go to the EU. Additionally, due to its robust economy, the nation is now the most crucial partner for practically all other EU members. When the commission assesses the EU's Stability and Growth Pact, which regulates fiscal deficits and public debt stocks, the next chancellor will be put to the test. German conservatives will fiercely oppose any calls for change. (Because the topic is so sensitive, Brussels officials have been told to hold off on sharing their opinions until after the German election.) However, many governments, including that of France, think the outdated regulations are inappropriate in today's environment of low long-term interest rates and urgent investment demand. Some anticipate a great bargain where Germany agrees to longer-term joint financing for the EU in exchange for a return to more of the previous norms of the treaty. Through collaborative weapons initiatives, it is slowly but surely moving from merely expressing an opinion to actually implementing a common European defence. These changes and others point to a growing understanding that economic policy has a geopolitical component. And that might indicate that the nation's foreign and security strategy has to be completely overhauled.
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